The Federal Communications Commission and Time Brokerage: A Regulatory Change of Course by Sewell, Stephen F.
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
TIME BROKERAGE: A REGULATORY CHANGE OF
COURSE
Stephen F. Sewell*
Over a period of more than fifty years, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission's position with re-
gard to broadcast licensees engaged in substantial
amounts of time brokerage has changed from grudg-
ing acceptance to encouragement. This article will
provide the bases for the changes and comment on
the Commission's current regulatory position. Time
brokerage initially might seem to be a matter of rela-
tively modest importance, but the Commission's re-
cent rulings on that topic raise several important is-
sues, including the standard used by the Commission
to determine the locus of control of broadcast sta-
tions, anticompetitive practices, and a licensee's nor-
mal renewal expectancy, if challenged by a compet-
ing applicant at renewal time.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Basics of Time Brokerage
A typical broadcast station arranges for program-
ming and, through its own sales staff, sells time to
local advertisers. The station may also hire a sales
representative or affiliate with a network to obtain
revenues from regional and national advertisers.
Some broadcasters may also engage in "time broker-
* Member, State Bar of Wisconsin; formerly attorney, Fed-
eral Communications Commission.
1 In re Petition of Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice of
Inquiry on Part-Time Programming, Policy Statement, 82
F.C.C.2d 107, para. 1 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Part-Time
Programming].
" In re Liability of Eller Television Co., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.2d 913 (1969). See also In re Lia-
bility of WGOK, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
F.C.C.2d 245 (1965) (involving the time brokerage of several
15-minute programs).
' In re Liability of Fort Collins Broadcasting Co., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 38 F.C.C.2d 707, para. 15 (1972).
Accordingly, time brokerage is not involved where the risk of
resale is absent, such as in a case where a licensee hires a person
who both announces and sells time during a particular program.
age," which is defined as the sale by a broadcast li-
censee of "discrete blocks of time to a 'broker' who
then supplies the programming to fill that time and
sells the commercial spot announcements to support
it."1 While large blocks of time are typically in-
volved, the Commission has dealt with time broker-
age of as little as ten-minute programs." A time bro-
ker "bears the risk of its resale; that is, he is directly
liable to the licensee for payment of the time."8
Broadcast licensees are not common carriers,' so no
licensee is obligated to sell time to any person, in-
cluding time brokers. In fact, many licensees do not
sell time to brokers as a matter of station policy. An
informal 1992 Commission survey of broadcast sta-
tions showed that only 17 of the 284 stations ques-
tioned, or six percent, engaged in some time
brokerage.5
B. The Statutory Basis for the Commission's
Concern
Under the Communications Act of 1934 ("Act" or
"Communications Act"), as amended, licenses to op-
erate broadcast stations can be applied for by indi-
viduals or entities upon written application, setting
That person would be considered a part-time employee, who
neither pays for the air time nor suffers a loss if commercial time
is unsold. In Re Application of Folkways Broadcasting Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 33 F.C.C.2d 806 (1972).
" 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988) ("[A] person engaged in radio
broadcasting shall not insofar as such person is so engaged be
deemed a common carrier"). See also Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (holding that there is no right of paid access to air time
under either the public interest standard of the Communications
Act or the first amendment to the Constitution).
5 Broadcast Station Time Brokerage Survey, Public Notice,
7 FCC Rcd. 1658 (1992). See also Part-Time Programming,
supra note 1, for more detail as to the extent and nature of time
brokerage, as it existed in 1980.
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forth specified information.' If a grant of the appli-
cation would serve the public interest, as defined by
the Act and the Commission's rules and policies, sec-
tion 309(a) of the Act requires the Commission to
grant the application." Once the license is issued,
section 310(d) provides that a license or any rights
granted by it cannot be assigned or transferred to a
new party without the Commission's prior
approval.'
Pursuant to the statutory scheme, the Commission
holds the licensee accountable for the programs
broadcast and for compliance with Commission and
statutory requirements. The concept of licensee ac-
countability antedates the Communications Act.
Chairman E. 0. Sykes of the Federal Radio Com-
mission, testifying on the legislation that later be-
came the Communications Act, characterized the
Radio Act as placing "upon the individual licensee of
a broadcast station the private initiative to see that
those programs that he broadcasts are in the public
interest. . . .Then that act makes those individual
licensees responsible to the licensing authority to see
that their operations are in the public interest." 9 The
advantage of the statutory scheme is that it places
responsibility in the hands of "an identifiable, regu-
lated entity - the licensee,"'" rather than in the
hands of transient, unregulated parties such as time
brokers or other program suppliers. Throughout its
history, therefore, the Commission has emphasized
that a broadcast licensee's responsibilities are nondel-
egable, particularly with reference to program-
ming."1 Until recently, the Commission believed that
the practice of selling "substantial segments of their
programming schedule" to brokers would raise
"questions as to whether the licensee thereby relin-
quished or diminished control of programming." 2
8 47 U.S.C. § 308(a) and (b) (1988).
7 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
8 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988). This section of the Act was
initially designated as section 310(b), but was redesignated as
section 310(d) in 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-505, 88 Stat. 1576
(1974). For ease of reference, section 310(d) will be used
throughout this article.
I Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 350 (1934),
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICA-
TIONS AcT OF 1934, 343, 696 (Max D. Paglin ed. 1989).
10 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 130 (1973).
11 E.g., In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Com-
munications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 26
(1974); Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIME BRO-
KERAGE POLICIES AND RULES
A. First Statements
The first mention of time brokerage occurred in
1938 in Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp.," which
involved a comparative hearing among several mutu-
ally exclusive applicants for new or modified broad-
cast stations. The Commission found one of the ap-
plicants unqualified because he had previously been
an officer and director of a licensee of a station that
failed to exercise adequate control of 151/4 hours per
week of brokered programming. Because the Com-
mission did not amplify the basis for its conclusion,
it is not possible to determine the extent to which
time brokerage was a problem by itself, whether the
lack of control of that programming was determina-
tive, or whether other derelictions cumulatively war-
ranted denial of the application for a new station.
Further, the opinion does not state whether the ap-
plication was denied because the applicant was un-
qualified to hold an authorization at all, or was basi-
cally qualified, but comparatively inferior to the
other applicants in the proceeding.
Just two years later, the subject came up again
under the guise of a "management contract." West-
inghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company
("Westinghouse") and the National Broadcasting
Company ("NBC") executed a contract that ex-
pressly reserved to Westinghouse "the ownership,
operation and control" of the stations, but designated
NBC as:
the sole agent of Westinghouse with authority to furnish
all programs broadcast from the stations, to enter into
agreement with others in [NBC's] own name and descrip-
tion and on [NBC's] own account and risk for the sale of
such broadcast programs, and to charge fees and collect
Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2313-14 (1960);
In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
para. 6 (1949); Report on Chain Broadcasting, 66, Government
Printing Office (May 1941)(quoted in National Broadcasting
Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1943). Note that it is the
responsibility for programming that is nondelegable, not the pro-
duction of programming. The Commission has long recognized
that a licensee may delegate to others the production of a pro-
gram or program series.
12 In re Clarifying Paragraph (c) of Section 1.613 Concern-
ing the Filing of Agreements Involving the Sale of Broadcast
Time for Resale, Order, 33 F.C.C.2d 653, para. 2 (1972)[here-
inafter Filing of Agreements].
" In re Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of the Commission, 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938), set




and retain all revenues resulting from the broadcasting of
such programs."'
After review of the arrangement, the Commission or-
dered hearings on Westinghouse's four pending li-
cense renewal applications to determine whether the
licensee had in each case "assumed the responsibili-
ties and discharged the duties of a licensee;" whether
it had "disposed of any of the rights granted in the
station's license to any other person" in violation of
section 310(d) of the Act; and whether NBC was op-
erating the stations without a license. 5
Westinghouse sought reconsideration of the hear-
ing orders on the ground that it had since voided the
NBC management contract and, in its place, negoti-
ated a standard network affiliation contract with
NBC. Further, Westinghouse had hired its own
staff, produced its own local programming, and set
its own advertising rates. The Commission granted
reconsideration and the license renewal applications
to Westinghouse on the basis of the amended ar-
rangement. In so doing, the Commission observed
that the recitation in the first contract regarding
Westinghouse's retention of control was not determi-
native in light of the other provisions of the first con-
tract. Rather, the Commission concluded that by
permitting NBC to operate the stations under the
terms of the contract, "Westinghouse disposed of
rights and privileges granted to it by the terms of its
licenses and to all intents and purposes transferred
control of the stations [to NBC] without obtaining
the written consent of the Commission as required"
by section 310(d) of the Act."8
"' In re Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing. Co.,
Opinion and Order on Petition to Reconsider and Grant With-
out Hearing, 8 F.C.C. 195, 195 (1940)[hereinafter
Westinghouse].
5 These issues appear in each of the four hearing orders
and are identically worded. The orders are set out serially at 5
Fed. Reg. 3397-98 (1940).
18 Westinghouse, supra note 14, at 196.
17 10 Fed. Reg. 9718 (1945) (announcing the adoption of
the rule, then designated as section 1.342 of the Commission's
Rules). The Commission twice renumbered the rule without
substantive change, first to section 1.613 of its Rules, Reorgani-
zation and Revision of Chapter, 28 Fed. Reg. 12,387 (1963),
and then to its current designation, section 73.3613. Reregula-
tion of Radio and TV Broadcasting, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,481,
38,485 (1979). The rule called for the filing, within 30 days of
execution, of contracts "relating to the sale of time to 'time bro-
kers' for resale . . ." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3613(d) (1991).
is 5 U.S.C 553 (c) (1988). Under that statute, the Commis-
sion must accompany the adoption of a rule with "a concise gen-
eral statement of their basis and purpose." Id.
Filing of Agreements, supra note 12, para. 2.
o In re Amendment of Section 1.342 of the Commission's
B. Adoption of a Rule
The Commission adopted the first rule pertaining
to time brokerage in 1945. The Commission did not
limit the amount of time that could be sold to bro-
kers. Instead, it adopted a rule that required certain
contracts to be filed with the Commission, including
management and time brokerage contracts.1 7 As was
often the case at that time, before the adoption of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 8 the Commission
provided no rationale foadopting the rule, other than
to state that it would serve the public interest. As
noted above, however, the Commission subsequently
stated that the purpose the rule was to insure the
retention of licensee control. 9 On three occasions,
the Commission made minor changes in the rule.2
0
C. Enforcement Actions
There are numerous enforcement actions taken by
the Commission under the rule. In some cases, the
Commission conducted hearings on a variety of is-
sues specified against an applicant, including the
failure to file time brokerage agreements.2 In 1960,
Congress amended the Act to grant the Commission
authority to fine licensees for violations of the Act
and the Commission's Rules.2 2 The digests disclose
several fines for failure to file time brokerage con-
tracts, sometimes as a single violation, 28 but usually
as one of several violations.2 4 Thus, the failure to file
time brokerage contracts, by itself, is considered a
minor violation that is not license threatening.
Rules, 9 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1547 (1953) (excluding from the def-
inition of "time brokerage" time bought by advertising agencies
on behalf of sponsors); See Filing of Agreements, supra note 12,
para. 2. (excluding "barter" and "tradeout" agreements from the
definition of time brokerage, which effectively overruled the
Commission's action in In re Rand Broadcasting Corp., 22 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 155 (1971)); In re Reregulation of Radio and
Television Broadcasting, 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1719, para. 5
(1972) (eliminating the filing requirement for time brokerage
contracts, but obligating retention of the contracts at the station
for Commission inspection).
" See e.g., In re Portorican American Broadcasting Co., De-
cision, 14 F.C.C. 239 (1949).
2 Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 894 (1960) (current version
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) and 504 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
23 See e.g., In re Liability of Eller Telecasting Co., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.2d 913 (1969); In re Lia-
bility of WGOK, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
F.C.C.2d 245 (1965).
2" See e.g., In re Liability of Rhode Island Broadcasting Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.2d 708 (1968); In
re WMIE, Inc., 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 494 (1965).
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In Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp.,"5 the licen-
see had sold approximately seventy-five percent of its
time to brokers, and the licensee's failure to super-
vise the many brokers resulted in a variety of viola-
tions of Commission requirements; for example, log-
ging violations, and the broadcast of false and
misleading advertising." The Commission found
that the licensee had in fact abandoned control of the
station to the brokers, and denied the license renewal
application.
There are other cases dealing with substantial
time brokerage, but these included serious, unrelated
issues as well. In Carol Music, Inc.,27 the licensee
sold twelve hours per day, seven days per week to a
broker. Although station personnel selected specific
records to be played, the broker specified the format,
had its own rate card, and sold all of the advertising
during the brokered periods. The presiding hearing
officer found that the licensee had abandoned con-
trol, but only during the periods brokered. He found
that the licensee had disposed of "rights granted to it
under the station's license without prior knowledge
or approval of the Commission," in violation of sec-
tion 310(d) of the Act."8 Among the other issues in-
volved the use of the station's subcarrier to transmit
gambling information to illegal gambling parlors.
The Commission's decision in Continental Broad-
casting, Inc., 9 involved a finding of abandonment of
control primarily involving time brokers,"0 but the li-
censee had also made misrepresentations to the Com-
mission. A misrepresentation, by itself, may result in
loss of license."1 In both Continental and Carol the
" In Re Application of Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp.,
Decision, 59 F.C.C.2d 558 (1976) reconsideration denied, 61
F.C.C.2d 257 (1976), remanded, Cosmopolitan Broadcasting
Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the Court up-
held the Commission as to abandonment of control, but re-
manded for further proceedings to determine whether the licen-
see's asserted "meritorious programming" mitigated against loss
of license), on remand, 75 F.C.C.2d 423 (1980)(the Commission
found that the asserted meritorious programming did not out-
weigh the violations found, and it again denied renewal of li-
cense), reconsideration denied, 79 F.C.C.2d 16 (1980), atfd by
judgment, No. 80-1902 (D.C. Cir. filed Jun. 29, 1981), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
28 Cosmopolitan, 581 F.2d at 919-20.
27 In re Revocation of License and Subsidiary Communica-
tions Authorization of Carol Music Inc., Initial Decision, 37
F.C.C. 385 (1963).
28 Id. at 400.
" In Re Application of Continental Broadcasting, Inc., De-
cision, 15 F.C.C.2d 120 (1968).
"0 The case involved the broadcast of four brokered pro-
grams, totalling about 12.5 hours each broadcast week. Assum-
ing a broadcast week of 126 hours (18 hours per day), the
brokered time represented less than 10 percent of total program-
Commission did not accord specific weight to the va-
rious violations, so it is unknown as to whether the
abandonment of control to the broker in those cases,
by itself, would have resulted in loss of license.
D. Time Brokerage Between Separately Owned
Stations Serving the Same Area
1. The Purposes Underlying the Cross-Interest
Policy
The Commission has closely reviewed situations
where one station sought to broker time on a com-
petitor. Its concern was based on its 'cross-interest
policy, which developed in case law as a corollary to
the multiple-ownership rule. 2 The rule limits the
number of broadcast stations that a person or entity
can own or control. That rule has evolved considera-
bly over time, but at this time an entity can own AM
and FM stations in the same area. Further, upon an
appropriate showing, the Commission may approve
the acquisition of additional broadcast combinations,
such as owning two FM stations or an FM-TV
combination in the same area. The purposes of the
rule are to "encourage diversity of ownership in or-
der to foster the expression of varied viewpoints and
programming, and ... to safeguard against undue
concentration of economic power."33 The cross-inter-
est policy has the same purposes and is intended to
cover situations that are not within the precise terms
of the rule, but where the goals underlying the rule
would be thwarted.3 '
ming. The finding of the licensee's lack of control rested primar-
ily on its failure to assure that the brokers accurately logged
commercial time.
21 See e.g., FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
2 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1994). The rule specifies ownership
restrictions in addition to those described here; for example, lim-
its on the number of stations that can be commonly controlled
nationally.
"2 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Televi-
sion Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17,
para. 3 (1984).
" In In Re Application of Wisconsin Television, Ltd., 102
F.C.C.2d 1001 (1985), the Commission stated that the "policy is
grounded in our concern over 'the potential for conflict of inter-
est, unfair competition, and detriment to the public interest'
which may result from certain types of business relationships,
not expressly covered by the terms of the multiple ownership
rule." Id. at 1004 (quoting Eastern Broadcasting Corp., 30
F.C.C.2d 745, 755 (1971). For example, the multiple-ownership
rules do not apply to employees, but the Commission might
question under the cross-interest policy a situation where an in-
dividual appeared as both the general manager of one television
station and the controlling stockholder of another television sta-
[Vol. 3
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2. Applicability of the Cross-Interest Policy to
Time Brokerage Agreements Between Separately
Owned Stations Serving the Same Area
In WCVL, Inc., 6 the licensee of an AM-FM
combination petitioned the Commission to permit it
to broker time on the only other station licensed to
the same city. Under the multiple-ownership rule
then in effect, an entity could not control more than
one AM or one FM station in the same area. 6 The
proposed licensee/broker wanted to buy nine hours
per week from its FM competitor to broadcast local
high school sports events, which involved about ten
percent of the competitor's broadcast week. The
Commission stated that the "policy against cross in-
terests is strongly applied to preserve full, arm's-
length competition of all types between indepen-
dently owned stations serving substantially the same
area." 37 In order to permit time brokerage between
such stations, the Commission placed the burden on
the petitioner to show that "a situation must exist
which shows at the threshold that no other arrange-
ment can be made other than the time brokerage ar-
rangement." 8 The Commission concluded that the
petitioner's own economic and programming judg-
ments did not meet that standard, and denied the
petition. 9
In contrast, the licensee made the requisite show-
ing in Station WWSM.' There, the licensee had
been broadcasting local, predominantly white high
school sports events. The station wished to continue
carrying those games, but had changed to a black-
oriented music format. The licensee sought approval
for its plan to buy time on a nearby station to pre-
sent the football games of a predominantly black
high school in the area. No other station in the area
showed an interest in carrying the latter games. The
broker proposed to buy 2.5 hours for each game, for
a nine-game season. The Commission granted its ap-
tion in the same market.
" In Re Request by WCVL Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 879 (1975).
8' 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 and 73.240 (1974).
37 WCVL, Inc., supra note 35, at 882.
8 Id.
99 Id.
"' In Re Request by Station WWSM, 31 F.C.C.2d 584
(1971).
41 Id. at 585.
" See eg., In re Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979);
In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d
(1981); reconsidered in part, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981); afl'd in
part and remanded in part sub nom, Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir.
proval, but cautioned that its ruling was limited to





Starting in 1979, the Commission began major
deregulatory actions." The following year, the Com-
mission significantly changed its position on time
brokerage in Part-Time Programming."4 The Com-
mission there set out a policy of "general encourage-
ment" of time brokerage," which could "foster
healthy program competition and diversity of pro-
gramming by encouraging independently produced
programming."" Such a result, "comports fully with
the Commission's interest in moving from regulatory
to competitive incentives .... ,,4' The Commission
further found that although the radio industry typi-
cally seeks a specialized audience, there are some
groups "whose tastes continue to go unmet because
they are too small to support an entire weekly sched-
ule" of specialized programming."7 The Commission
also predicted that there would be opportunities for
employment of minorities in the industry as a result
of time brokered programs directed at minority
groups." The Commission made clear that these
changes did not alter the licensee's underlying re-
sponsibilities: "Although we are encouraging the use
of time brokerage to increase program diversity, this
should not be taken as indicative that the Commis-
sion has lessened its concern about abdication of con-
trol over station operation as a whole or station pro-
gramming in particular."'
9
In a 1989 reexamination of its cross-interest pol-
icy, 0° the Commission determined that it should
abolish the prohibition against one station brokering
time on another station in the same market. The
1983), on remand, 96 F.C.C.2d 930 (1984), reconsideration de-
nied, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) (1984), remanded, 779 F.2d 702
(D.C. Cir. 1985), on remand, 104 F.C.C.2d 505 (1986).
41 In re Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice
of Inquiry On Part-Time Programming, Policy Statement, 82
F.C.C.2d 107 (1980).
I d. para 17.
4 Id. para. 2.
46 Id.
' Id. para. 31.
48 Id. para. 20.
41 Id. para. 17.
1* In Re Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest




Commission noted the substantial increase in the
number of media outlets since the inception of the
cross-interest policy, and the concomitant increase in
competition and diversity."' The Commission found
that due to competitive conditions, a station broker-
ing its time to a competitor risks losing some of its
audience to the competitor. "Thus, the amount of
choice available to listeners and viewers insures that
competition will be vigorous in order for a station to
retain its share of the audience."52 Because a licensee
entering into a time brokerage contract must retain
control of its programming, the Commission believed
that the fact that some programming may be pro-
vided by a competitor did not raise the same diver-
sity questions that would be raised if stations in the
market were under common ownership or shared
key employees.53 The Commission also noted that
the antitrust laws would be available to remedy any
anticompetitive arrangements.5
The Commission also made related policy changes
that facilitated time-brokerage arrangements. Prior
to deregulation, the Commission had prohibited com-
bination rates and other joint sales practices between
licensees of separately owned stations.55 The Com-
mission eliminated this policy in 1986,56 noting that
combination sales practices had been upheld by the
courts in nonbroadcast cases where the parties estab-
lished that such rates or practices led to efficiencies
and reduced costs, and did not affect competition ad-
versely. Further, the potential for abuses, not actual
violations, was not an appropriate basis for regula-
tion, in the Commission's view.57 It also listed possi-
ble benefits resulting from the abolition of the policy;
for example, aiding fledgling FM stations in ob-
taining national sales representatives. Accordingly,
the Commission concluded that brokering time on
another station in the same market should no longer
be subject to a flat ban against joint sales practices, if
the joint sales fall within the limitations of the anti-
trust laws. 58




55 See In re Combination Advertising Rates and Other Joint
Sales Practices, First Report and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 51 F.C.C.2d 679 (1975); Combination Advertising
Rates, 45 F.C.C. 581 (1963).
5 In re Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation,
51 Fed. Reg. 11,914 (1986); 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1500
(1986) [hereinafter Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation].
67 Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, supra note 56, para
47.
" Id. para. 48.
B. Adjudications Under Deregulation
In 1990 and 1991, the Commission issued six rul-
ings under the new regulatory approach described
above, in which one station in a market (the
brokered station) would sell time to another station
in the same market (the brokering station)." The
rulings and the policy that evolved from them will be
referred to here as the "Spanish Radio" rulings or
policy, after the lead case. There are variations in
facts in those rulings, but they contained the follow-
ing common elements: (1) the amount of time per-
mitted to be brokered was all or nearly all of the
brokered stations broadcast week, including news
and issue-oriented programming; (2) the area served
in common by the two stations was very substantial,
often involving encompassment of one station's ser-
vice area by the other, and always involving substan-
tial overlap of the stations' principal-community con-
tours, the strongest field intensity contour used by
the Commission for administrative purposes; (3) the
licensee of the brokered station reduced its staff sub-
stantially, usually by eliminating all or most of its
sales, programming, promotion and traffic staffs, but
retaining at least a general manager and some engi-
neering staff; and (4) all brokered licensees asserted
that they would retain ultimate control, and specifi-
cally retained the right to cancel or suspend pro-
grams and commercials, and to substitute programs
they considered to be of greater importance.
The Commission approved all of the time broker-
age agreements. The Spanish Radio rulings noted
the licensees' recitation about retention of control of
the brokered station. The rulings also noted the
Commission's encouragement of time brokerage set
out in Part-Time Programming60 and the fact that
decision did not set any limits on the amount of time
that a station could broker. Four of the rulings cited
Southwest Texas Public Broadcasting Council" as
an example of an extensive management contract
'9 Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, MM, to Roy Russo,
Spanish Radio Network, 5 FCC Rcd. 7586 (1990); Letter from
Edythe Wise, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Joseph A. Belisle,
5 FCC Rcd. 7585 (1990); Letter from Roy Stewart, Chief,
MM, to J. Dominic Monahan, 6 FCC Rcd. 1867 (1991); Letter
from Roy Stewart, Chief, MM, to Peter D. O'Connell, 6 FCC
Rcd. 1869 (1991); Letter from Roy Stewart, Chief, MM, to
Brian M. Madden, 6 FCC Rcd. 1871 (1991); Letter from Roy
Stewart, Chief, MM, to Gisela Huberman, 6 FCC Rcd. 5397
(1991).
*o Part-Time Programming supra note 1.
61 In re Southwest Texas Public Broadcasting Council, 85
F.C.C.2d 713 (1981). There, the licensee held a license for a
noncommercial television station, and had entered into a man-
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that did not involve an unauthorized transfer of con-
trol to the manager." Further, the decisions cited
Cross-Interest Policy6" which recognized the aboli-
tion of the ban on brokerage by one station on an-
other in the same market. Some of the decisions also
cited the elimination of the flat ban on joint sales
practices in Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation."
The decisions reminded all licensees involved that
the brokered station must remain responsive to the
issues confronting its city of license, as reflected in
their issues/programs lists, 65 and must comply with
the laws, rules and policies relating to political pro-
gramming.66 Other decisions stated that the brokered
station "must continue to air its own station identifi-
cations, maintain its own main studio within its
principal-community contour, and maintain its own
public inspection file . . .-.
The various Spanish Radio decisions set out sev-
eral cautionary points. "[W]hile we may approve a
time brokerage agreement, the Justice Department
may determine that the enforcement of antitrust laws
is necessary to remedy an anticompetitive arrange-
ment that may occur as a result of the implementa-
tion of ... [the] agreement. ' '68 Further, the Commis-
sion reminded the licensees of brokered stations that
if they were not responsive to local issues, they might
not be entitled to a "renewal expectancy," '69 if chal-
lenged at renewal time by a competing application
for a new station.
The Spanish Radio rulings are silent as to the
agement contract with the University of Texas under which the
University would operate the station on a day-to-day basis. The
record showed that the licensee established operating policies for
the station, and that there was a regular review of the Univer-
sity's performance as to personnel, finances and programming.
The record showed that the University submitted major propos-
als to the licensee for its advance approval. In that context, the
Commission stated that a licensee may have delegate operational
duties and responsibility to the university, but a necessary part
of that delegation is the licensee's right to "revoke this delegation
by terminating the contract and thereafter to exercise full re-
sponsibility over all matters involving the operation of the sta-
tions." Id. at 716.
6" See Letter to Dominic Monahan; Letter to Peter
O'Connell; Letter to Brian Madden; Letter to Gisela Huber-
man, supra note 59.
6" Cross-Interest Policy, supra note 50.
64 Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, supra note 56.
65 The Commissiori requires each commercial radio station
to place in its public inspection file on a quarterly basis "a list of
programs that have provided the station's most significant treat-
ment of community issues during the preceding three-month pe-
riod." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(a)(9) (1994).
66 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7) and 315 (1988); 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.1930, 73.1940, and 73.4185 (1994).
67 E.g., Letter to Dominic Monahan, supra note 59.
stimulus that caused the several licensees to turn
over the operation of their stations to a competitor.
There is undoubtedly some variation among the
licensees of the brokered stations for making such a
change, but the move to extensive time brokerage
probably reflects the poor economic health of the ra-
dio industry.7 0 A financially distressed licensee, per-
haps faced with the realization that the station could
be sold only at a loss, might well seek an alliance
with a more successful broadcaster in the area.
Given the substantial reductions in the staff of the
brokered station and other economies resulting from
the joint operation, the brokering station might be
able to operate both stations profitably.
C. Codification of the Spanish Radio Policy
In 1991, the Commission sought comment on its
proposal to amend its radio multiple-ownership rule
by permitting an increase in the number of stations
that could be under common control, both locally
and nationally.7 At the time the Commission issued
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in that proceed-
ing, four of the six decisions that established the
Spanish Radio policy had been issued. The Commis-
sion recognized that the effect of an increase in the
local ownership limit could be amplified if licensees
also brokered time without restriction to stations in
the market. Accordingly, it sought comment on time
brokerage specifically, and on other joint ventures
68 Id.
6o Id. The renewal expectancy is described and discussed
more fully in section IV.C.3., below. Briefly, if an application
for a new station is filed against an application for renewal of
license of an existing station, one of the factors used to choose a
winner will be the performance of the renewal applicant during
the past license term. Renewal applicants that establish a strong
performance are said to have a renewal expectancy, which is a
factor that will be considered when comparing the two
applicants.
"' As of May 31, 1994, there were 9,958 commercial AM
and FM radio stations on the air competing for revenues. Broad-
cast Station Totals As Of May 31, 1994, FCC News Release of
June 7, 1994. The same News Release also disclosed that there
were 1,689 noncommercial FM stations on the air that compete
with commercial stations for listeners and, to a lesser degree, for
advertising revenues. All stations face increasing amounts of
competition from other sources, such as music channels available
on many cable television systems. The Commission cited a study
of the National Association of Broadcasters finding that 58 per-
cent of all radio stations lost money in 1991. In Re Revision of
Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC Red. 2755,
para. 2 n.3 (1992); reconsideration in part, 7 FCC Rcd. 6387
(1992)..
71 In Re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Notice of




After review of the comments, the Commission did
increase the number of radio stations that could be
under common control.73 It also determined that a
licensee of one station could broker more than fifteen
percent of the time on a competing station only if it
could own the brokered station under the amended
multiple-ownership rule.7 4 The Commission further
imposed a twenty-five percent limit on the amount of
simulcasting or program duplication between the two
stations75 and directed that a copy of the time-bro-
kerage contract be filed with the Commission and
placed in both stations' local public inspection files.7 1
Although the Commission imposed these new re-
strictions, it essentially affirmed the Spanish Radio
policy. It reemphasized the obligation of licensees of
brokered stations, like all other stations, to retain
control of operations and to provide issue-responsive
programming. On reconsideration, the Commission
restated the potential pitfalls arising from extensive
time brokerage: possible loss of a renewal expec-
tancy; and potential violations of the laws relating to
anticompetitive practices.7 7 It also clarified some
points raised in the comments filed in the proceed-
71 Id. paras. 26-30.
7' In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and
Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2755 (1992) [hereinafter Revision of Radio
Rules]. By codifying the Spanish Radio decisions in this
rulemaking proceeding, the Commission eliminated for radio
broadcast stations any questions that might otherwise have been
raised under the multiple-ownership rule and its corollary, the
cross-interest policy. At this time, those questions remain un-
resolved for television stations.
", Id. para 65.
75 Id. para. 66. Section 73.3556(b) defines "duplication" of
programming to mean "the broadcasting of identical programs
within any 24 hour period."
78 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.3526(a)(12), 73.3613(d) (1994).
" Revision of Radio Rules, supra note 73, para. 64.
78 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125 (1994).
79 In re Amendment of Sections 73.1125 and 73.1130 of the
Commission's Rules, Main Studio and Program Origination
Rules for Radio and Television Broadcast Station, Report and
Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 3215 (1987). The Commission interpreted
the main studio rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125 (1994), to require
during normal business hours "management and staff presence
on a full-time basis, which may consist of more than two people
working on a part-time basis." Petition for Reconsideration of
Jones Eastern of the Outer Banks, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 6800, para. 5 n.4 (1992). "Manage-
ment" includes a wide range of jobs, and specifically includes a
"chief engineer with managerial duties." Id. paras. 9-10.
80 See Revision of Radio Rules, supra note 73, para. 66.
The Commission has no other requirements regarding the mini-
mum number of employees. Most of the Spanish Radio rulings
indicate that the brokered station will remain responsible for op-
eration of the transmitter. There is nothing, however, that would
ing. Some commenters had asked the Commission to
reassess the main studio rule,7 8 which, as inter-
preted, requires the presence of at least one full-time
managerial and one part-time staff person at the
main studio during normal business hours.79  The
Commission stated that subject was outside the scope
of the proceeding, so the two-person standard re-
mains applicable to brokered stations.8" The Com-
mission also decided against limiting the duration of
time-brokerage contracts or regulating provisions re-
garding liquidated damages, in the event of a breach
of contract. It did state, however, that if "a licensee
agrees to an excessive liquidated damages clause or
to an unreasonably lengthy brokerage agreement,
that licensee's control of its station may be ques-
tioned."8" Stations operating under time-brokerage
agreements not consistent with the new requirements
were provided one year to come into compliance."'
In January of 1995, the Commission issued a fur-
ther notice primarily proposing amendments to the
television multiple-ownership rule, but also seeking
comment on television time-brokerage agreements.83
The Commission stated there that its experience in
radio indicated that time brokerage could "provide
prohibit contracting these duties to another entity, including the
brokering station. Further, the Commission's rules permit opera-
tion of the transmitter from a remote site, 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.1400, 73.1410 (1994), and at least one contract on file at
the Commission specifies a remote control point at the brokering
station. If the brokered station also collocates its main studio at
the brokering station, and the licensee of the brokering licensee
assumes the obligation to staff the studio during normal business
hours, the licensee of a brokered stations could theoretically have
no one employed at its station.
" Revision of Radio Rules, supra note 73, para. 66.
82 Id. In addition, the Commission clarified two other as-
pects regarding the relationship between time brokerage and the
amended multiple-ownership rules. Under those rules, the licen-
see of one station in a market with more than 15 stations cannot
buy another station in that market if their combined audience
share exceeds 25 percent. Finally, while there is generally no
limit on one station brokering time on a station in another mar-
ket, such arrangements may not be made where the brokering
licensee has reached the local ownership limit in the other mar-
ket. Id.
8a In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of
Policy and Rules, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10
FCC Rcd. 3524 (1995) [hereinafter Regulations Governing Tel-
evision Broadcasting]. The Commission found that the comments
filed in an earlier rulemaking proceeding on the subject were not
sufficiently helpful, resulting in the 1995 further notice. See In
re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Televi-
sion Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy




competitive and diversity benefits to both the broker-
ing parties and to the public." '84 The notice did not
state the basis for that belief. The notice sought com-
ment on the extent to which time brokerage exists in
the television industry, and tentatively proposed
guidelines and filing requirements very similar to
those already in place for radio stations."
D. Summary of Time Brokerage Contracts on File
With the Commission
There has been considerable interest in time bro-
kerage since the codification of the Spanish Radio
policy for radio stations. As of July 7, 1994, there
were 398 time brokerage contracts available for re-
view in the Commission's files as a result of the
amended filing rule. In order to understand better
the results of the Commission's actions, the author
reviewed twenty (about five percent) randomly se-
lected contracts filed with the Commission.8 Sub-
stantial time brokerage is primarily, but not exclu-
sively, a small-market phenomenon. The median
population of the brokered stations' cities of license is
18,387. The duration of the contracts, assuming no
defaults or extensions, ranges from nine months to
eight years. In fourteen contracts (seventy percent)
the parties elided the monthly fee. In the remaining
six contracts, fees range from $1,725 to $12,900 per
month."' In five cases (twenty-five percent), the bro-
ker had either filed an application to buy the
brokered station or had signed a contract to do so. 8
Another five contracts (twenty-five percent) give the
broker an option to buy the brokered station, while
three (fifteen percent) grant the broker a right of
first refusal in the event of a sale.
All of the contracts state that the licensee of the
brokered station retains full authority over the sta-
tion and its operations, sometimes specifically men-
tioning control of finances, personnel and program-
Id. para. 135.
8 Comments have now been filed. Given the importance and
complexity of the proceeding, a decision analyzing the comments
and adopting rules would not ordinarily be expected before the
fall of 1995.I Six of the contracts called for the broker to provide pro-
gramming to commonly owned AM-FM combinations in the
same market. Accordingly, the 20 contracts affected 26 stations.
The numbers and percentages that follow are based on the num-
ber of contracts reviewed, not the number of stations.
0' The contracts typically call for adjustments in the
monthly payments due to equipment failure and for licensee
preemptions of the brokers' programs. Some of the contracts per-
mit the broker to cancel the arrangement if licensee's preemp-
tions exceeded specified amounts, ranging from 15 percent to 0.1
ming. All contracts in some manner grant the
licensee the right to reject a program provided by the
broker or to substitute programming the licensee be-
lieves has greater local or national interest. Seven-
teen (eighty-five percent) of the contracts provide a
general statement as to the programming to be pro-
vided by the time broker. These statements often
specify that the programming would be in good taste
and consistent with the Commission's requirements
and other laws. Alternatively, some of the contracts
require the broker to provide entertainment pro-
gramming, along with commercials, news, public af-
fairs programs and promotions. Fifteen (seventy-five
percent) of the contracts either state the licensee's
specific program policies, which the broker is re-
quired to follow, or indicate that such policies exist,
but have not been submitted. The licensees' pro-
gramming policies enumerate anywhere from five to
27 specific provisions. Some of the contracts suggest
that it is the broker's obligation to present issue-re-
sponsive programming, others indicate that such pro-
gramming is the licensee's duty, while some suggest
that the obligations are shared between the parties in
varying degrees. Two of the contracts (ten percent)
required the broker to provide in advance to the li-
censee information concerning the programming to
be broadcast, such as traffic logs, play lists and
scripts, if any. Two other contracts permit the licen-
see to ask for such information in advance, if it
chooses to do so.
The typical contract provides that the broker will
provide programming for twenty-four hours per day,
seven days per week. In fourteen (seventy percent) of
the contracts, the licensee reserved one-half to four
hours per week, usually sometime between 4:00 a.m.
and 10:00 a.m. on Sunday." During that time, the
licensee of the brokered station "may" present its
own programming. Six of the contracts (thirty per-
cent) do not specifically reserve any time for the li-
percent of the hours in a month. Those figures translate to 25.2
hours and 0.72 hours (or 43.2 minutes) per month, respectively.
In the latter case, the licensee has a strong incentive to minimize
preemptions if it wants to continue the brokerage contract in
effect.
' The contracts with the shortest duration are those where
the broker intends to buy the brokered station. The contract in
that case might specify a duration of one year, or until the bro-
ker buys the station, whichever is earlier.
'1 One licensee reserved up to eight hours per week so that
it could present its regularly scheduled news and public affairs.
This was the most extensive reservation of time found in the
contracts reviewed, and the only one that did not limit the re-
served time to Sunday mornings.
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censee of the brokered station to present any pro-
gramming on its own, but two of these do reserve
time for the maintenance of the station's facilities.
The contracts typically require the licensee of the
brokered station to hire at least two employees, often
identified as a general manager and a chief engineer,
and other contracts mention unspecified additional
employees." There was no similar lack of precision
in the three contracts where the broker's employees
were mentioned. In those cases, the broker was obli-
gated to provide on-air talent, engineering personnel
or board operators, sales persons and traffic person-
nel. The responsibility for the operation and mainte-
nance of the station's technical facilities varies widely
under the contracts reviewed. One contract specifi-
cally contemplates that the control of technical facili-
ties of the brokered station would be from a remote
point located in the broker's studio.
Although the contracts do not provide detailed in-
formation as to the actual operation of the stations, it
is evident that the licensees of the brokered stations
have at least reduced the number of their employees
substantially and turned over sales and programming
functions to the broker for all but a few hours per
week.9" Based solely on the terms of the contracts,
control of programming varies from advance review
of the broker's proposed programming to simply re-
quiring the broker to provide information to include
in the station's quarterly issues/programs list. It is
not possible to determine what additional control of
programming might result from whatever monitor-
ing of the brokered station's broadcasts by its few re-
maining employees. This broad overview of the con-
tracts provides relevant background for the following
9o Five of the contracts specifically mentioned only one licen-
see employee, nine mentioned two employees, and one contract
mentioned three. The remaining contracts were silent as to the
number of employees to be hired by the licensee.
"1 There are, of course, numerous other provisions in the
contracts dealing with such matters as payment of taxes and in-
surance, events of default, responsibilities on termination of the
contract and the like. While some of those provisions might be
pertinent in a specific case, the descriptions in the text are lim-
ited to those factors most relevant to the Commission's general
regulatory functions.
92 The one exception is the Cosmopolitan case, supra note
25. There, the licensee brokered about 75 percent of its time, but
to numerous brokers.
Ba Every one of the Spanish Radio rulings was far beyond
the 15-percent figure that triggers the applicability of the multi-
ple-ownership rule. In Letter to Joseph Belisle, supra note 59,
the brokering licensee proposed providing between 12 and 24
hours per day to the brokered station. The Commission ap-
proved the agreement, "regardless of the number of hours of
programming." Id. In Letter to Roy Russo, supra note 59, the
comments.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE COMMISSION'S
CURRENT REGULATORY POSITION
A. Introduction
The Spanish Radio rulings represent a substantial
shift in the Commission's treatment of time broker-
age. With one exception,"2 time brokerage previously
involved a limited amount of a licensee's broadcast
week, often split among several different brokers.
The brokered licensee, however, obtained or pro-
duced most of the remaining programming, includ-
ing local news, public affairs and other issue-respon-
sive programming, and retained its own sales staff.
The Spanish Radio policy, in contrast: (1) permits
the brokered licensee to rely on the broker as its sole
source of income; (2) permits the use of a single
source for all programming, including local news,
public affairs programs and other issue-responsive
programs, as well as for entertainment93; and
(3) with regard to programming, permits the
brokered licensee to limit its involvement to an un-
specified degree of monitoring of the station's
broadcasts. 4
The discussion below will first consider the pro-
cess by which the Commission arrived at the Spanish
Radio policy. It will then turn to issues raised when
licensees make use of the policy. In that regard, the
summary of the time brokerage contracts set out
above discloses that not all brokered licensees have
gone as far as the Spanish Radio policy permits.
Clearly, the greater the distance between a licensee's
decision issued to the Spanish Radio Network, the brokered sta-
tion retained the four hours between midnight and 4:00 a.m. It
is not known whether the licensee broadcast during those four
hours, or whether the station was dark for all or part of that
period. The remaining rulings were based on requests involving
nearly all of the broadcast week.
Providing all of the entertainment of a station's entertain-
ment programming, by itself, does not raise the issues discussed
below. The Commission has long been aware of the existence of
networks and music subscription companies that will provide en-
tertainment programming to radio licensees around the clock,
and has not promulgated any regulations limiting such arrange-
ments. The 1992 BROADCASTING & CABLE MARKET PLACE,
pp. F-37 through 44, F-62 through 64, lists numerous radio net-
works and music subscription companies that will provide 24-
hour per day entertainment programming in a variety of for-
mats. At one time, the Commission did adopt a policy with re-
gard to music subscription companies, but abolished the policy
before it became effective. See generally, Unnecessary Broadcast
Regulations, supra note 56.
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operation and the outer limits of the Spanish Radio
policy, the lower the concerns expressed below will
be. The following discussion of those issues is di-
rected at those licensees that take the full measure of
the expanded concept of time brokerage."'
B. The Basis for the Spanish Radio Policy
The Commission relied heavily on its decision in
Part-Time Programming,96 in crafting the Spanish
Radio policy. There, the Commission sought to en-
courage time brokerage, based on a general desire to
substitute competitive incentives for government reg-
ulation.97 The Spanish Radio policy certainly accom-
plishes those general goals. The specific grounds for
encouraging time brokerage set out in Part-Time
Programming, however, were: (1) fostering program-
ming competition and diversity by encouraging inde-
pendent program producers; (2) providing program-
ming to segments of the audience that are too small
to support a full weekly schedule; and (3) offering
possible increased opportunity for minorities in the
broadcasting industry, to the extent that time broker-
age results in programming directed to minority
groups. 8
The Spanish Radio policy does not appear to en-
courage independent program producers. To the con-
trary, it places the programming of a second station
in the hands of an existing licensee, not an indepen-
dent producer, and lessens the number of potential
" An interesting side light to the material that follows, re-
gardless of one's views on these subjects, is the working of the
administrative process. The relevant statutory provisions have
not significantly changed during the regulatory/deregulatory
phases of the process. Instead, the changes are in the communi-
cations industry and the Commission's perspective as to where
the public interest lies in the regulation of that industry.
96 Supra note 1.
I d. para. 1.9aId. paras. 1-2.
9' Under the cross-interest policy, it would be expected that
the Commission would question the ownership of one station by
a person who is also concurrently employed as the general man-
ager of a competing station in the same market. In fact, the
Commission has a pending inquiry and rulemaking proceeding
in which it proposes to remove key employees from the cross-
interest policy and to place them within the restrictions of the
rule as contrary to diversity in programming viewpoints and full
competition between the stations. Cross-Interest Policy, supra
note 50. Substituting the entire staff of a brokering licensee for a
single key employee raises the same concerns.
1o 47 C.F.R. § 73.3556(a) (1994).
101 47 C.F.R. § 73.3556(b) (1994).
10. At one time, the Commission had a rule that limited the
amount of duplication between commonly owned AM and FM
stations in a market, again defined in terms of "identical" pro-
radio outlets in a market for independent producers.
Because the policy places the programming of two
stations under the day-to-day control of the broker-
ing licensee, it lessens competition, as compared to
separately operated stations.
The policy also lessens diversity, especially in re-
gard to issue-responsive and other informational pro-
gramming, in the sense that the programming deci-
sions of two stations are made by one entity."
Moreover, section 73.3556(a) of the Commission's
rules100 specifically permits twenty-five percent pro-
gram duplication of the programming on the two
stations, which affords enough time to permit com-
plete duplication of the broker's local news, public
affairs and issue-responsive programming on the
brokered station. Further, the Commission defined
duplication as the "broadcasting of identical pro-
grams within any twenty-four hour period."1 1 The
use of the word "identical" permits extensive dupli-
cation in the remaining seventy-five percent of the
brokered programming. Presumably, a six-hour
"Morning Show" would not be "identical" if a few
musical selections or public service announcements
were varied between the program broadcast by the
brokered and the brokering stations.1 0 2 It follows
that there is no assurance that any significant diver-
sity will result. Accordingly, the Spanish Radio rul-
ings standing by themselves do not further the stated
objectives of increasing competition and diversity."0
The subsequent codification of the policy in Revi-
gramming. 47 C.F.R. § 73.242 (1985) ("[D]uplication is defined
to mean . .. the broadcasting of a particular program by one
station . ..before or after the identical program is broadcast
over the other station"). The digests of the F.C.C. Reports do
not disclose any decisions that further define "identical" under
that former rule. In the absence of any amplification by the
Commission, the programs described in the text would not be
"identical" within the dictionary meaning of the word: "being
the same: having complete identity . . . ." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1122 (3d ed. 1986).
103 In some limited circumstances, diversity might be aided
to a limited degree; that is, where the brokered station would go
silent in the absence of the brokerage agreement. In that case,
whatever differences in programming between the two stations
that were broadcast would provide more diversity than having
one of the stations dark. That rationale is not expressly stated in
the Spanish Radio rulings, but the generally poor financial con-
dition of the radio broadcasting industry was one of the grounds
for liberalizing the multiple-ownership rule to permit more com-
monly owned stations in the same market. A paradox is
presented, however, if preserving diversity by saving otherwise
failing stations is, in fact, an underlying rationale for the Span-
ish Radio policy. As noted previously, one of the Commission's
stated goals is to rely, where it can, on economic forces to regu-
late, rather than by imposing rules. One of the consequences of
such a policy should be that some stations will fail if they are
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sion of Radio Rules and Policies,"" in fact involved
a balance between the overall economic condition of
the radio industry on one hand, and the lessening of
competition and diversity on the other. The Commis-
sion specifically mentioned diminution of diversity
and competition implicit in extensive time brokerage
in that balancing process,1 " but made no reference
to the factors set out in Part-Time Programming.
The change in the Commission's position is substan-
tial. Before the Spanish Radio rulings the Commis-
sion encouraged time brokerage based on specific,
potential benefits, notably increased competition and
diversity. After codification of the policy, the Com-
mission recognized that unfettered time brokerage
could diminish competition and diversity to the de-
gree that limitations had to be imposed by rule.
Another stated basis for encouraging more time
brokerage, providing specialized programming to
small groups whose interests are now unserved, is
also absent under the Spanish Radio policy. Before
Spanish Radio, the typical time broker bought a lim-
ited amount of time to reach a small audience seg-
ment, a practice often described as "narrowcasting."
Such a broker would use its familiarity with its
"narrow" audience for program selection and eco-
nomic support. In contrast, a brokering station typi-
cally uses its existing program staff and seeks to
maximize the audience of the brokered station by
airing a format with a broad appeal. Accordingly,
the brokering station has no greater incentive to meet
unmet needs of small audience segments than it had
before entering the brokerage agreement.
Finally, it is not apparent that permitting one sta-
tion to broker another in the same market for its en-
tire broadcast day would have any effect on increas-
ing the opportunity for minority employment in the
broadcasting industry. Indeed, in light of the sub-
stantial reductions of staff at the brokered station
that appear to be the rule, and in light of the re-
duced incentives to hire individuals to produce and
badly managed or if the market in which they operate will not
support the station. Changing other policies, without more, to
save failing stations runs counter to the notion of marketplace
regulation.
'o Supra note 73.
105 The Commission stated in this regard:
We are particularly concerned that widespread and sub-
stantial time brokerage arrangements among stations serv-
ing the same market, in concert with the increased owner-
ship permitted by our revised local rules, could undermine
our continuing interest in broadcast competition and di-
versity. The record in this proceeding does not suggest
that such a result is at all likely. [Footnote omitted.] We
nonetheless believe it is prudent to preclude the possibility
present programming to minority groups, lessened
opportunities for minority employment would ap-
pear more likely. In sum, all the grounds offered in
Part-Time Programming for encouraging more time
brokerage are not served, or only very weakly so,
under the Spanish Radio policy, and only competi-
tion and diversity were considered specifically when
the Commission codified the policy in Revision of
Radio Rules and Policies.
In its decision in Cross-Interest Policy, the Com-
mission stated in reference to time brokerage that the
increase in media outlets since the implementation of
the cross-interest policy reduced the need to prohibit
time-brokerage agreements. 06 The decision also
noted that when a station brokers time to a competi-
tor, competitive concerns require it to remain alert to
responding to its overall audience, or risk the loss of
revenues.10 7 On that ground, the Commission ,over-
ruled its earlier decision in WCVL, Inc., where it
denied the request of one licensee to broker about ten
percent of a competitor's broadcast week. 08 That left
ninety percent of the week for competition, and for
concerns about loss of audience and revenues. In
contrast, where one station brokers a competitor
twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week, the
brokered station is relying on its competitor to retain
its audience and has concluded that its income will
be greater by using its competitor than by program-
ming the station itself. Thus, both of the major ra-
tionale set out in Cross-Interest Policy for permitting
brokerage on one station by a competitor are absent
under the Spanish Radio policy.
The Commission abolished its former general pro-
hibition against combination sales and joint sales
practices between separately owned stations serving
the same market on the ground that the prohibition
was overly broad. 09 It noted that in some circum-
stances such practices had been upheld where they
led to efficiencies and reduced costs, and where they
of such an outcome by imposing certain limits on local
time brokerage arrangements....
Id. para. 64. The limits were set out in 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.3555(a)(2) and (3)(iv), 73.3556 (1994). As related above,
these rules impose the multiple-ownership restrictions on any
station that brokers more than 15 percent of a' competing sta-
tion's broadcast week, and limits program duplication between
the two stations to 25 percent of the brokered station's broadcast
week.
... Supra note 50, para 37.
107 Id.
"o Supra note 35.




do not affect competition adversely.110 Under the
Spanish Radio policy, the brokered station remains
separately owned and controlled, according to the
Commission. As such, the brokered and brokering
stations are competitors. A contract whereby a sta-
tion turns over its programming and sales for the en-
tire broadcast week to a competitor on its face affects
competition adversely. The Spanish Radio rulings
provide no explanation to suggest a contrary
conclusion.
The Commission, like all administrative agencies,
is entitled to change its rules and policies. The courts
insist, however, that an agency changing rules or
policies "must supply reasoned analysis indicating
that its prior policies and standards are being delib-
erately changed, not casually ignored . . . ."" The
court's decision in Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 2 is instructive here. The Commission had is-
sued several decisions over the years setting out an
obligation by television licensees to meet the pro-
gramming needs of children, needs that had not been
met by the operation of normal marketplace forces.
The Commission subsequently overruled those rul-
ings in two sentences, one stating that its deregula-
tion of commercialization during children's program-
ming was consistent with its policy of deemphasizing
quantitative guidelines, and the other noting that
commercials help support the broadcast of children's
programming. In reviewing that action, the court
stated that being consistent with "a broad policy does
not tell us why that broad policy obtains in what had
uniformly been viewed by the Commission as the
unique" context of children's television program-
ming. 1 ' It concluded that the Commission had failed
to provide the necessary "reasoned analysis" for de-
parting from its former rules and policies, and re-
manded for further consideration.
The Commission's decisions in Part-Time Pro-
gramming, " Cross-Interest Policy,"3 and Unneces-
sary Broadcast Regulations"' appear to meet the
court test in the context in which they were made.
The difficulty arises in extending those rulings to 24-
hour-per-day time brokerage. It is clear that the
Commission meant to encourage time brokerage and
placed no upper limit on the amount or percentage
of time that could be brokered. The Spanish Radio
policy, as codified, encourages time brokerage to a
11 Id. para. 47.
... Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
"' 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
110 Id. at 746.
114 Supra note 1.
point where the stated underlying rationale for that
policy are almost completely absent. The rulemaking
proceeding in Revision of Radio Rules and Poli-
cies117 was focused primarily on relaxing the restric-
tions on the number of stations that could be under
common control. The discussion of time brokerage in
that proceeding did not involve further relaxation of
the time brokerage policies. Instead, that discussion
reflected a concern that the allowable increase in the
number of commonly owned stations in an area not
be extended by the use of time brokerage. The only
specific factor discussed was the concern about diver-
sity, which resulted in the rules applying the multi-
ple-ownership restrictions when one station brokers
more than fifteen percent of a competitors time and
limiting the amount of program duplication to
twenty-five percent. As noted, however, those rules
do not insure any significant degree of diversity. The
recently issued further notice of proposed rulemaking
regarding time brokerage in the television industry
does not address these matters.1 8 In the face of no,
or cursory, explanations for its change of course,
parties relying on the Spanish Radio rulings may be
faced with difficult questions if their conduct is ever
challenged in court. The Commission seems to have
moved from "the tolerably terse to the intolerably
mute." 9 Perhaps amplification of its position will
be provided when a decision is issued in the pending
television rulemaking proceeding.
C. Issues Raised by the Application of the Spanish
Radio Policy
The preceding material discusses the premises un-
derlying the Spanish Radio policy. Whatever those
premises may be, the application of the policy raises
additional issues in other areas of Commission regu-
lation. Three of the most important of these are dis-
cussed below.
1. Anticompetitive Practices
Commercial broadcasting centers around pro-
gramming and the sale of advertising. A station that
brokers 100 percent of its time to a competitor turns
over day-to-day programming decisions and grants
"1 Supra note 50.
110 Supra note 56.
"' Supra note 73.
110 Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, supra
note 83.
11. Greater Boston Television Corp., supra note 109, at 852.
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control of the sale of advertising, including rates
charged, to that competitor. Such an arrangement
between two separately owned competitors raises se-
rious questions as to anticompetitive practices, such
as price fixing. The Commission's failure to take ac-
tion is not a defense to an antitrust violation. There
is nothing in the Communications Act that "compels
the conclusion that the FCC was not intended to
have any authority to pass on antitrust violations as
such, [but] it is equally clear that courts retained ju-
risdiction to pass on antitrust violations irrespective
of Commission action.
12 0
When dealing with the qualifications of a specific
applicant, the Commission does not adjudicate al-
leged antitrust or anticompetitive violations."' In-
stead, it will only consider final decisions of the
courts or of competent administrative agencies, such
as the Federal Trade Commission. The FCC took
this position on several grounds: that courts and
other agencies have primary jurisdiction to police an-
titrust and anticompetitive matters; that it desired to
avoid duplicating the efforts of those entities; that
private law suits were available as an additional en-
forcement mechanism; and that by avoiding duplicate
proceedings, fairness to the parties in any pending
law suits would be aided. 22 In the Spanish Radio
rulings and their subsequent codification, however,
the Commission was dealing with a specific appli-
cant, but with a practice affecting a class of licen-
sees.1 2' Because the time brokerage contracts raise
such serious concerns for that class, the Commission
could have sought comment from the Justice Depart-
ment. It chose not to do so, and instead placed the
risk solely on the affected licensees. It should be
noted that the Justice Department and other agen-
cies involved with enforcement of laws relating an-
ticompetitive practices have, like the Commission, re-
source limitations. In allocating those resources,
"" United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U.S.
334, 343-44 (1959) (holding that approval by the Commission of
an agreement to sell a television station does not bar independent
civil antitrust actions by the government).
12 In re Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in
Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179, para. 43 (1986).
122 Id. para. 44.
1" As noted above in section III.D., the Commission's
records disclosed that 398 licensees had filed time brokerage con-
tracts by July, 1994.
124 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit once observed generally that "[aidministrative
agencies have been required to consider other federal policies,
not unique to their particular area of administrative expertise,
when fulfilling their mandate to assure that their regulatees op-
erate in the public interest." LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145,
1147 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974). More specifically, the Supreme
enforcement agencies tend to emphasize those activi-
ties with the greatest affect on the public and the
economy. It appears unlikely that a few economically
marginal stations, for the most part located in small
markets, would be high on any enforcement priority
list. Thus, if the price-fixing and other joint sales
practices inherent in the Spanish Radio policy do
present violations of state or federal laws dealing
with anticompetitive practices, the possibility of any
enforcement action may be very small. With the ben-
efit of hindsight, the Commission's failure to seek
comment from entities competent to consider an-
ticompetitive practices, such as the Justice Depart-
ment, is to a degree inconsistent with the Commis-
sion's obligation to consider other federal laws in
reaching its own public interest determinations.'"
2. Control of Stations
The Spanish Radio decisions all emphasized the
importance of a licensee's retention of control of the
brokered station. Because de jure control is clearly
held by that licensee, the decisions refer to de facto
control. Determinations as to de facto control are fact
driven, and case-by-case rulings are required. 5 In
the context of the Spanish Radio rulings, control of
programming, personnel and finances would proba-
bly be the focus of any inquiry.12 The Spanish Ra-
dio Policy permits the licensee of a brokered station
to turn programming over to the broker. In most
cases, the contracts suggest only a passive review of
programming by the licensee of the brokered station.
Personnel, as noted above, may be reduced to as few
as two part-time employees. The brokered station's
only involvement in finances is essentially the receipt
of payment for the brokered time and the payment of
a few employees and, in some cases, the costs of tech-
Court has stated that the Commission "should administer its
regulatory powers with respect to broadcasting in light of the
purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve." Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223
(1943). While suits to enforce the antitrust laws can be initiated
by private litigants, the costs to private parties of pursuing such
cases lessens their efficacy as an enforcement mechanism.
126 In Re Application of Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 55 F.C.C.2d 819, para. 7 (1975),
modified, 59 F.C.C.2d 1002 (1976).
" See e.g., In re Application of Stereo Broadcasters, Inc.,
87 F.C.C.2d 87 (1981). For a more thorough discussion of the
Commission's treatment of de facto control, see Stephen F. Sew-
ell, Assignments and Transfers of FCC Authorizations Under
Section 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, 43 FED.
COM. L.J. 277, 296-302 (1991).
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nical operation, maintenance and capital
improvements.
The kind of operation permitted under the Span-
ish Radio policy represents a very minimal degree of
control. There are Commission rulings in analogous
areas that provide some guidance. Specifically, man-
agement agreements are a known factor in broad-
casting. In fact, section 73.3613(c) of the Commis-
sion's Rules requires that such contracts be filed
with the Commission.12 Whether those, contracts
constitute a de facto transfer of control depends on
the terms of the agreements and the implementation
of those terms. The Commission approved a man-
agement contract in Southwest Texas Public Broad-
casting Council."8 Although the licensee had dele-
gated day-to-day operation of the station to the
University of Texas, the licensee can still be fairly
characterized as actively involved in the operation
and control of the station. In contrast to Southwest
Texas, time brokerage, by its nature and as evi-
denced by the contracts reviewed, places the licensee
in largely a passive role. 29
The control of broadcast stations under the Span-
ish Radio policy reflects some of the factors used by
the Commission when dealing with control of sta-
tions licensed in nonbroadcast services, such as the
microwave stations used by communications common
carriers to carry their traffic from one point to an-
other. 30 Section 310(d) of the Act governs transfers
of control of those licenses, as well as broadcast li-
127 47 C.F.R. § 73.3613(c) (1994).
128 Supra note 61 and accompanying text. Note that the
University, unlike the situation in the Spanish Radio rulings,
was not the licensee of any broadcast station. This factual dis-
tinction eliminates from the Southwest Texas case the concerns
expressed above as to possible anticompetitive practices and
makes much simpler analysis of the issues regarding the renewal
expectancy, which will be discussed in the next section.
129 As noted in section III.D. of this article, of the time bro-
kerage contracts reviewed, only two (10 percent) required ad-
vance approval of the broker's programming by the licensee of
the brokered station.
1"0 The Commission identified elements it would consider in
determining the locus of control of microwave stations to include:
the unfettered use of all facilities and equipment . . ., day
to day operation and control; determination of and the
carrying out of policy decisions, including the preparation
and filing of applications with this Commission; employ-
ment, supervision, and dismissal, of personnel; payment of
financial obligations including expenses arising out of op-
eration; and the receipt of moneys and profits ....
In Re Application of Intermountain Microwave, 24 Rad. Reg.
(P&F) 983, 984 (1963). By subsequent Public Notices, the
Commission's staff stated that it would use essentially the same
factors to determine compliance with section 310(d) in regard to
cellular telephone radio stations, and specialized mobile radio
censes. Because the various services are governed by
the same statute, there is no legal barrier to the
adoption of a single standard of review as to control
for all services. There is, however, a significant dif-
ference between the broadcast and nonbroadcast ser-
vices. Nonbroadcast licensees do not control the con-
tent of the traffic they transmit. However a major
component of the typical broadcast operation is the
exercise of editorial control over its programming or
"traffic." As a matter of policy, the question is why
the Commission has deemphasized or ignored control
of programming as an important element in deter-
mining the locus of control of its broadcast licensees.
The Spanish Radio policy may have altered en-
forcement policy with respect to compliance with
section 310(d) of the Act as applied to broadcast sta-
tions. For example, in Fine Arts Broadcasting,
Inc.,"' the Commission adopted a policy generally
prohibiting proposed buyers of a broadcast station
from assuming management positions at the station
while a sales application is pending before the Com-
mission, even where the agreement recites that con-
trol of the station would remain with the seller while
the application is pending. The potential for a viola-
tion of section 310(d) was so great as to warrant
such a policy. One of the Spanish Radio rulings dis-
cussed the Fine Arts policy, although the case in-
volved an as-yet unexercised option to buy, not a
sales contract. 82 In the circumstances giving rise to
the Spanish Radio rulings; the licensee is in difficult
systems. See Mobile Services Division Releases Guidance Re-
garding Questions of Real Party in Interest and Transfers of
Control for Cellular Applications in Markets Beyond Top 120,
1 FCC Rcd. 3 (1986); Private Radio Bureau Reminds Licensees
of Guidelines Concerning Operation of SMR Stations Under
Management Contracts, 64 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 840 (1988). The
latter Public Notice specifically approved the hiring of manage-
ment companies. It was directed in part to applicants for new
facilities, and additional factors were mentioned that relate to
new applicants, including the source of financing, the nature of
the contracts between the manager and the equipment supplier,
and the ability to terminate the contract for failure to perform.
181 In Re Application of Fine Arts Broadcasting, Inc., 57
F.C.C.2d 108 (1975). This case adopted a general policy in
place of case-by-case rulings, such as in In Re Request of Phoe-
nix Broadcasting Co., 44 F.C.C.2d 838 (1973).
182 Letter to Roy Russo, SUPRA note 59, at 7587. This deci-
sion distinguished the Fine Arts policy on the grounds that there
was no infusion of capital and no showing that the broker had
assumed a management position, both elements found in Fine
Arts. The second distinction is strained. The broker is techni-
cally an independent contractor, not an employee. Yet the bro-
ker's role at the brokered station, or that of its management em-
ployees, is the equivalent in all relevant respects to the
employee/manager in Fine Arts.
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financial condition; it turns its programming and
sales functions over to a former competitor and relies
solely or primarily on that competitor for the income
it receives; and substantially reduces its own staff.
The licensee of the brokered station essentially serves
to supervise and pay the few remaining employees,
probably pay the technical operating costs (electric
power, for example) and maintenance, cash the
checks it receives from the brokering station, and
have someone monitor the programming. There ap-
pears to exist the same or greater potential for a vio-
lation of the Act under the Spanish Radio policy as
in the situation found in the Fine Arts case."'
The Commission has exceedingly wide discretion
as to its method of enforcing the Act, and is under no
obligation to adopt policies to prohibit situations
with a high potential for violations. The Commission
is clearly within its discretion in electing to put
brokered licensees on notice of their responsibility to
retain control and, when violations are found, to im-
pose whatever sanctions are appropriate. The diffi-
culty is that the Commission did not overrule or even
mention Fine Arts when it codified the Spanish Ra-
dio policy. As noted, twenty-five percent of the time-
brokerage contracts reviewed involved brokers that
had either executed contracts or filed applications to
buy the brokered station. These parties are either at
risk of some enforcement action, or are hoping the
Commission overruled Fine Arts without so stating.
3. Renewal Expectancy
When the Commission is confronted with an un-
contested application, the Commission must deter-
mine whether the applicant has established that a
grant would be minimally consistent with the public
interest standard. When there are two or more pend-
' This changed enforcement concern also may be coupled
with the imposition of modest penalties when violations of sec-
tion 310(d) are found. The Commission can take away licenses
for unauthorized transfers of control and can issue fines of up to
$250,000 for violations of the Act and its Rules. In Letter from
Donna Searcy, Secretary, to Benito Rish, M.D., 6 FCC Rcd.
2628 (1991), however, the Commission fined a licensee only
$10,000 for abandonment of control. It is not known whether
this case is indicative of future penalties for violation of section
310(d) of the Act or is limited to its own facts.
,' In re Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Compar-
ative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). This policy is
currently under review. See In re Reexamination of the Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 2664 (1992); In re Reexamina-
tion of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hear-
ings, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd.
ing applications for a vacant channel, the Commis-
sion must make a comparative choice from among
the applicants that are basically qualified. The com-
parative factors are set out in Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings."4 The law also
permits the filing of an application for a new station
against the license renewal application of an existing
station. In such a case, the factors set out in the 1965
Policy Statement will be considered. In addition, the
renewal applicant may be able to establish that it is
entitled to a "renewal expectancy." The strength of
the expectancy depends on the merit of the renewal
applicant's past record. "Where .. . the incumbent
rendered substantial but not superior service, the 'ex-
pectancy' takes the form of a comparative preference
weighed against other factors . . . .An incumbent
performing in a superior manner would receive an
even stronger preference. An incumbent rendering
minimal service would receive no preference.'
5
The Commission set out three grounds for the re-
newal expectancy:
(1) There is no guarantee that a challenger's paper pro-
posals will, in fact, match the incumbent's proven per-
formance. Thus, not only might replacing an incumbent
be entirely gratuitous, but it might even deprive the com-
munity of an acceptable service and replace it with an in-
ferior one. (2) Licensees should be encouraged through
the likelihood of renewal to make investments to ensure
quality service. Comparative renewal proceedings cannot
function as a "competitive spur" to licensees if their dedi-
cation to the community is not rewarded. (3) Comparing
incumbents and challengers as if they were both new ap-
plicants could lead to a haphazard restructuring of the in-
dustry especially considering the large number of group
owners. We cannot readily conclude that such a restruc-
turing could serve the public interest.' s6
This statement was made in the context of a con-
ventional broadcast operation. Applying the quoted
5475 (1993); In re Reexamination of the Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 2821 (1994). These pro-
ceedings are the result of the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Bechtel
v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992) and Bechtel v. FCC, 10
F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
IO In re Application of Cowles Broadcasting, Inc., 86
F.C.C.2d 993, para. 61 (1981), afl'd sub nom. Central Florida
Enterprises. Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). The service referred to in this
context is measured primarily by reference to the station's issue-
responsive and other informational programming. In re Deregu-
lation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d
797, para. 17 (1981), on remand, 104 F.C.C.2d 505(1986).
"' Cowles Broadcasting, Inc., supra note 133, para. 62.
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factors to a 100-percent brokered station, however,
presents difficulties. Initially, it should be noted that
the renewal expectancy is in part a legal fiction, be-
cause it assumes that the renewal applicant will re-
main the owner of the station after defeating a new
challenger. There is no Commission rule that limits
the renewal applicant's ability to sell the station,187
and it is free to do so shortly after the comparative
hearing. Where a licensee relies completely or nearly
so on the performance of its time broker to establish
a renewal expectancy, the legal fiction is attenuated
further. The time brokerage contract may expire by
its terms, may be abrogated by mutual agreement of
the parties, or one of the parties may not perform its
obligations under the contract, and so bring about a
default. The substitution of one broker for another is
not subject to the Commission's review or approval.
In those circumstances, the renewal applicant's
"proven performance" may be as much a "paper
proposal" as the challenger's.
Apart from this general concern about extending
the renewal expectancy to 100-percent brokered sta-
tions, the first factor quoted above does retain its va-
lidity. Assuming no abandonment of control, 8' the
renewal applicant has either set out standards for the
broker to observe or has monitored the brokers per-
formance sufficiently to assure a performance by the
broker that would warrant a renewal expectancy.
There is virtually no incentive, however, for the li-
censee of a brokered station to invest in quality ser-
vice because it receives a flat fee from the broker,
without regard to service. Finally, the Commission's
reluctance to restructure the broadcast industry
through the renewal process is understandable. This
factor presumably is not based on the ground that
the Commission wants to aid broadcasters, but that
187 Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules imposes a
one-year holding period on the winner of a comparative hearing
between two or more applicants for a new station. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3597 (1994) (emphasis added). That rule does not apply to
an applicant for renewal of license, which presumably could sell
the station as soon as the decision granting its renewal becomes
final.
"' No renewal expectancy would be available to the re-
newal applicant if there has been an unauthorized transfer of
control of the station to the broker. The Act places the burden
on the renewal applicant to establish that its performance is con-
sistent with the public interest so as to warrant renewal. 47
U.S.C. § 309(a) and (e) (1988); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 546, 550 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). A renewal applicant shown to have granted or aban-
doned control to a broker cannot claim credit for a performance
over which it had no control, regardless of the merits of the bro-
ker's programming.
"' Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, supra
the public will ultimately be better served by broad-
casters that perceive a stable environment for their
investment. From the perspective of the ownership of
broadcast stations, that factor remains for an 100-
percent brokered station. To the extent that invest-
ment in programming is concerned, however, it is
not at all apparent how the public will benefit." 9
It might be thought that a significant renewal ex-
pectancy might be absent or significantly lessened
where the renewal applicant relies solely on dupli-
cated issue-responsive programming from the bro-
ker's station in the same market.1 40 In Radio Station
WABZ, Inc.14 the Commission rejected that conten-
tion in a roughly analogous situation. There, WABZ
filed renewal applications for its commonly owned
AM and FM stations. Victor Broadcasting, Inc.
(Victor) filed a mutually exclusive application for a
construction permit only for a new FM station. The
Commission observed that program duplication was
inherently inefficient, but also noted that under the
rule then in effect, 100-percent duplication was per-
mitted for commonly owned AM-FM stations in the
small market involved in that case. 42 The Commis-
sion concluded that WABZ's inefficient use of the
frequency by program duplication "only slightly de-
tracts from the station's overall broadcast record, and
that a strong comparative preference was war-
ranted. 43 Similarly, substantial time brokerage is
permitted under the Spanish Radio policy and pro-
gram duplication up to twenty-five percent is per-
mitted by Section 73.3556(a) of the Commission's
Rule."4 The broker is presumably under the control
of the licensee, so the Commission might reason that
duplicated programming from the broker should be
accorded the same treatment given to the duplicated
programming in Radio Station WABZ, Inc. The
note 83, para. 139. The Commission did invite comment on the
effect of time brokerage on the renewal expectancy. Clarification
of this issue will undoubtedly result from this inquiry.
140 As noted above, section 73.3556 of the Commission's
Rules limits program duplication between brokered and broker-
ing stations to "25 percent of the total hours in its average
broadcast week .... ." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3556 (1994). Typically all
issue-responsive and other informational programming could be
simulcast without running afoul of this limitation.
141 In re Applications of Radio Station WABZ, Inc., Deci-
sion, 90 F.C.C.2d 818 (1982), aff'd sub noma. Victor Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, 722 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
142 Id. para 50.
148 Id.
.4, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3556 (1994). The 25-percent limit ap-
plies to the entire broadcast day. With this limit, there still can
be complete duplication of issue-responsive and other informa-




Commission, however, has not yet decided the
issue.""'
V. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to point out some of the
issues that follow from the Commission's changed
regulatory position regarding extensive time broker-
age. Questions as to unauthorized transfers of con-
trol may prove the most problematic, in light of the
passive, almost superficial indicia of control accepted
by the Commission. I believe that some of the bro-
kerage agreements are likely to result in unautho-
rized transfers and that others may be shams in-
tended to avoid the requirements of section 310(d) of
the Act. In my opinion, the Commission failed to
give the potential violations of that important statu-
tory provision sufficient weight when it adopted the
Spanish Radio policy, or, alternatively, failed to pro-
vide sufficient factual support or analysis to support
its conclusions.
4 6
There seems to be no current outcry for changes
141 In re Broadcast Communications, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 61 (1984) (involving a renewal
applicant that engaged in part-time brokerage). The station did
in fact present issue-responsive programming on its own. The
decision observed that some of the brokered programming con-
tained issue-responsive material. However, the extent of that
material is not precisely stated, and there was an unresolved
conflict of fact on that point. The Commission concluded that a
in the Spanish Radio policy, and the likely stimulus
for change might not arise until there is an adverse
judicial ruling or legislative change. There are, how-
ever, many ways to minimize or eliminate the con-
cerns expressed here. One approach would be to
adopt, after an appropriate rulemaking proceeding, a
rule that: (1) imposes a fifteen percent limit (or some
other modest figure) on local time brokerage; (2)
adopts a limit on the amount of issue-responsive pro-
gramming that can be supplied by the broker or, al-
ternatively, a limit on the extent a renewal applicant
can rely on duplicated issue-responsive programming
to establish a renewal expectancy; and (3) requires
the broker to purchase control of the station, subject
to Commission approval, if the two licensees want to
exceed the fifteen percent bench mark. Such an ap-
proach would more effectively implement and en-
force section 310(d) of the Act, minimize concerns
about anticompetitive practices, and permit resolu-
tion of renewal/new applicant comparative cases
under existing precedent.
renewal expectancy was warranted, but whether that conclusion
rested in part on the material broadcast during the brokered pro-
gramming is not at all clear.
140 I make that statement with the benefits of hindsight and
of leisurely contemplation, both luxuries not available to a very
capable but overworked Commission staff. Those of us who
comment on the Commission's decisions should be thankful we
have those luxuries.
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